Microplastics are stored in the balls.

By cherry picking a few Republican priorities designed to spite big tech and totally ignoring the big enforcement efforts that the Biden administration has pursued through the FTC and the DOJ Antitrust Division, in both tech and non-tech industries.

The communication that kicked off this whole thing was saying something positive about Trump and something negative about Democrats in direct comparison, on an issue that the Democrats are actually way better on.

It’s not just saying something positive about a political official or party. It’s actively saying “this party is better than that party.” And he was wrong on the merits of the statement.

And then amplifying the message using an official account is where it went off the rails. CEOs are allowed to have opinions as individuals. But when the official account backs up the CEO, then we can rightly be skeptical that the platform itself will be administered in a fair way.

These fuckers act like they’ve never heard of Lina Khan. Let’s see if Republicans try to replace her with someone with a stronger track record. Or, if they’re so serious about tech competition maybe they’ll get on board with net neutrality.

And look, I actually like Gail Slater (the Trump nominee that kicked off this thread). She’s got some bona fides, and I welcome Republicans taking antitrust more seriously, and rolling back the damage done by Robert Bork and his adherents (including and probably most significantly Ronald Reagan).

But to pretend that Democrats are less serious about antitrust than Republicans ignores the huge moves that the Biden administration have made in this area, including outside of big tech.

That would only explain the phenomenon in urban areas that actually have zoning. Rural areas are suffering from the same thing, but don’t have zoning restrictions, so obviously that points to another cause.

Bring back neighborhood grocery stores you can walk to.

This is actually probably more a federal antitrust/competition law thing than a local zoning thing. Otherwise it wouldn’t have happened nationwide. I found this article to be pretty persuasive:

Food deserts are not an inevitable consequence of poverty or low population density, and they didn’t materialize around the country for no reason. Something happened. That something was a specific federal policy change in the 1980s. It was supposed to reward the biggest retail chains for their efficiency. Instead, it devastated poor and rural communities by pushing out grocery stores and inflating the cost of food. Food deserts will not go away until that mistake is reversed.

. . .

Congress responded in 1936 by passing the Robinson-Patman Act. The law essentially bans price discrimination, making it illegal for suppliers to offer preferential deals and for retailers to demand them. It does, however, allow businesses to pass along legitimate savings. If it truly costs less to sell a product by the truckload rather than by the case, for example, then suppliers can adjust their prices accordingly—just so long as every retailer who buys by the truckload gets the same discount.

. . .

During the decades when Robinson-Patman was enforced—part of the broader mid-century regime of vigorous antitrust—the grocery sector was highly competitive, with a wide range of stores vying for shoppers and a roughly equal balance of chains and independents. In 1954, the eight largest supermarket chains captured 25 percent of grocery sales. That statistic was virtually identical in 1982, although the specific companies on top had changed. As they had for decades, Americans in the early 1980s did more than half their grocery shopping at independent stores, including both single-location businesses and small, locally owned chains. Local grocers thrived alongside large, publicly traded companies such as Kroger and Safeway.

With discriminatory pricing outlawed, competition shifted onto other, healthier fronts. National chains scrambled to keep up with independents’ innovations, which included the first modern self-service supermarkets, and later, automatic doors, shopping carts, and loyalty programs. Meanwhile, independents worked to match the chains’ efficiency by forming wholesale cooperatives, which allowed them to buy goods in bulk and operate distribution systems on par with those of Kroger and A&P. A 1965 federal study that tracked grocery prices across multiple cities for a year found that large independent grocers were less than 1 percent more expensive than the big chains. The Robinson-Patman Act, in short, appears to have worked as intended throughout the mid-20th century.

Then it was abandoned. In the 1980s, convinced that tough antitrust enforcement was holding back American business, the Reagan administration set about dismantling it. The Robinson-Patman Act remained on the books, but the new regime saw it as an economically illiterate handout to inefficient small businesses. And so the government simply stopped enforcing it.

That move tipped the retail market in favor of the largest chains, who could once again wield their leverage over suppliers, just as A&P had done in the 1930s. Walmart was the first to fully grasp the implications of the new legal terrain. . . . Kroger, Safeway, and other supermarket chains followed suit. . . . Then, in the 1990s, they embarked on a merger spree. In just two years, Safeway acquired Vons and Dominick’s, while Fred Meyer absorbed Ralphs, Smith’s, and Quality Food Centers, before being swallowed by Kroger. The suspension of the Robinson-Patman Act had created an imperative to scale up.

A massive die-off of independent retailers followed. Squeezed by the big chains, suppliers were forced to offset their losses by raising prices for smaller retailers, creating a “waterbed effect” that amplified the disparity. Price discrimination spread beyond groceries, hobbling bookstores, pharmacies, and many other local businesses. From 1982 to 2017, the market share of independent retailers shrank from 53 percent to 22 percent.

The whole thing is worth reading.

Your whole baseline assumption in this thread is that most people are raised in an environment where they are likely to reach their full genetic potential. That’s an assumption that isn’t true in most populations.

If you have a population that has poor childhood nutrition, they won’t grow to be as tall as if they had proper access to good food. If you have a heterogenous population where some have access to good nutrition and some don’t, then the distribution of heights in that population will be less genetically determined than if they were all equally fed good nutrition.

Or, for another example, we know the number of fingers a person has is coded in their genes. But if you actually go perform a survey of the population to see how many fingers they have, and you collect their genomes, you wouldn’t be able to correlate those observed outcomes to genomes, because pretty much everyone who has a number of fingers other than 10 got that way through something environmental (perhaps prenatal development, often an industrial accident or something). So the heritability of the number of fingers is actually close to zero.

Same with sports or fitness: rank the population by how fast they can run 5k, and you’ll find out basically nothing about their genetics from those results. The variance in outcomes is utterly dominated by how much they actually run and train, not their genetic potential.

Turning to intelligence, that same phenomenon plays out. Childhood lead exposure, childhood nutrition, access to education (including mentorship and social support for learning), family stability, external stressors (and the accompanying internal changes to one’s endocrine system and brain development in high stress environments), all contribute to intelligence. And certain traits that do affect intelligence are less heritable than others (e.g., certain cognitive conditions). All those factors put together in the real world “experiment” of how humans grow up differently mean that even if intelligence were highly heritable in a homogenous environment, the differences in people’s environments would still get a wide distribution of outcomes due to non-genetic factors.

That shouldn’t mean we make up the facts.

You’re the one getting facts wrong!

You’ve said that the Jones-affiliated bid was higher, which is incorrect. The Onion’s $7 million bid was higher, which is why the bankruptcy judge said that the other bidder should’ve been given an opportunity to improve its bid.

You’ve said that the $7 million valuation wasn’t based on anything. It’s a straightforward formula for determining the value when to reduce the claims of the creditors who wanted to credit bid.

You’ve said that the $7 million valuation was made up based on estimates of future cash flows. Future payments have nothing to do with the bid, and weren’t used in the formula to calculate the value at $7 million. That value is how much this bid brings to the estate immediately.

Even future payments were a percentage of profits and but not guaranteed.

That’s not part of the bid. The bid only had two components: a cash portion and a commitment to reduce claims by certain creditors. For non-participating creditors, it’s the exact same equivalent as a $7 million cash payment to the estate.

Future promises were made to families to incentivize them to reduce their claims (and therefore bring more money to the estate), but that’s not part of the bid itself.

I think you’re struggling to understand what’s happening here because you’re so anchored on your initial incorrect perceptions.

There was some future payments promised

It’s not future payments promised. Just a division of who to split the proceeds with. And so for the typical creditor who didn’t credit bid, The Onion’s bid was worth the equivalent of a $7 million cash bid, and therefore was more valuable than the Jones affiliates’ $3.5 million cash bid.

It’s just math. The Onion bid was higher, and the judge said that the losing bid should’ve been given an opportunity to improve the bid to get a chance to win, and maybe raise even more money.

The value of the Onion’s bid was $7 million ($1.75 million in cash, $5.25 million in credit), when you include the credit bids from the families. That’s where you’re getting tripped up in trying to understand what the court was ruling.

They are not telling the onion to offer more money, they are giving the one with the highest bid the chance to make it even bigger.

No, the Jones-affiliated bidder had a smaller bid, but should’ve been given the opportunity to try to outbid the then-highest bid from the Onion.

Basically the judge said that the trustee, as auctioneer, should’ve gotten the two bidders into a bidding war to maximize the price.

I’ve been following this closely.

The normal way bankruptcy auctions go is basically some version of this:

1. Everyone who wants to bid has to sign an NDA about the assets.
2. Everyone who signs the NDA can perform their due diligence, look at financial statements and other confidential information about the assets in the auction, to figuratively kick the tires. If there’s actual physical property involved, bidders are generally allowed to physically inspect it (if it’s a tractor, for example, you can bring a mechanic to help sort out the tractor’s condition).
3. Before the deadline, every bidder submits a secret bid to the trustee.
4. The trustee evaluates the bids, looks to see which is best, and decides whether the top bids are close enough to hold a live public auction or allow topping bids for the bidders to say “hey you’re only $1 million short from the current top bid, you want to throw more money at this?,” and going around and around until the trustee is sure they’ve gotten the best and final bid from everyone.

The judge is upset that the trustee didn’t really do step 4, which in the bankruptcy process is designed to squeeze out the highest possible price for the sale. The losing bidder says they submitted a lower bid than their absolute top “best and final” they would have, because they thought they’d have an opportunity to improve the bid in a step that never happened.

So they’re going back to do it again. Presumably the trustee will propose a new auction process that explicitly puts out well defined rules on how creditors (like the Sandy Hook families) can credit bid with credit against their own claims, instead of actual cash. They’ll need to calculate exactly how much each dollar of credit bid brings to the non-participating creditors (like Sandy Hook families who don’t want to credit bid), and make sure that for each creditor who isn’t credit bidding gets the most money out of the sale.

I don’t think it’s over. The judge specifically said that he believes the trustee tried to do the right thing, but ultimately didn’t follow a process that was designed to raise the most money.

there was a $10k bounty,

$60k. $10k from NYPD and $50k from the FBI.

I think that some people had trouble with the raised angle of the hostel smile photo, and the way that cameras of different focal lengths (technically, more a function of distance between camera and subject) tend to flatten three dimensional features in slightly different ways. The posts where people were saying that various pictures don’t look like the same person, but like you, I think they look pretty similar.

Yes it does. It’s only offered on an irregular basis, so for the people that would only go to McDonald’s for the McRib, and no other item, would need to be notified when it’s available.

Harnessing this phenomenon .

Which business leaders were killed on the way to securing a 5-day workweek? Those gains were achieved through direct action affecting business bottom lines: strikes, sabotage, and direct action on the streets, not secret targeting of soft targets.

Put another way: there were two attempted assassinations of Donald Trump in the past year. Do you think that will change his political actions to be more popular?

Do you think that United Healthcare’s next CEO will suddenly forgo profits? What about hospital administrators, pharma CEOs, or any of the other tens of thousands profiting off of this fucked up system? Do you think that a mass assassination campaign will actually happen in large enough volume to change any behavior at all?

You’d take the 2nd choice and hire bodyguards. Sure, you might. But not everybody would.

No, the question isn’t whether everyone would. It’s whether anyone would. And the answer is obviously yes.

So now the position is filled. Did the healthcare system change?

My argument is that no, you can’t kill your way to reform on this one. There will always be another CEO to step into that place.

And the ratio of dead would-be assassins to CEOs would also pile more bodies on.

This is ludicrous. A person faced with unpopular decisions that might send assassins after him is going to make himself harder to assassinate, not less hated.