Admin team of LGBTQIA.Social Mastodon instance received abuse email from Russian censorship agency, where they demanded to remove an account. The account in question represented a small group that ran a collaborative blog for LGBTQIA youth and adults in Russia.

Shortly after refusal to comply with agency’s demands, the instance was blocked and is now unreachable from Russia.

All previous blocks of Fediverse instaces in Russia were related to hosting CSAM.

  • rglullis@communick.newsEnglish
    32·
    8 months ago

    But blocking the instance at the DNS level does not stop the content from reaching other Russian instances, right? They would have to basically track every server that is federating with them and block like this.

      • vortic@lemmy.worldEnglish
        30·
        8 months ago

        Other instances hosted outside of Russia but available from inside Russia can still federated with them, though, right?

      • rglullis@communick.newsEnglish
        141·
        8 months ago

        You could fix it with a relay, or having the instances conn extend with the rest of the Internet through a VPN/proxy.

        Yeah, a PITA but can still be worked around.

      • Damage@slrpnk.netEnglish
        81·
        8 months ago

        If it’s a DNS block I guess Russian instances just need to direct the domain to the IP address in their hosts file

        • CyberTailor@lemmy.worldOPEnglish
          101·
          8 months ago

          It’s always IP + DNS + Deep Packet Inspection. To access blocked websites, you have to use some sort of proxying.

      • cabbage@piefed.social
        3·
        8 months ago

        Curious - would boosts from users on non-blocked servers bypass the block here? In other words, does traffic for boosts go via the original instance, or is it direct between the boosting and the receiving servers?

        • CyberTailor@lemmy.worldOPEnglish
          51·
          8 months ago

          does traffic for boosts go via the original instance

          That way. You can’t trust a third-party instance to proxy content, every server has to get its own copy.

          • cabbage@piefed.social
            6·
            8 months ago

            Fair point, would be an incredibly easy vector for abuse in any other way. Good thing I’m not a software engineer.

      • rglullis@communick.newsEnglish
        11·
        8 months ago

        They know it already.

        Anyway, it is interesting that this particular case is better handled by something like Nostr.