“If a malware flashes a ROM then you buy their laptop and erase the hdd or ssd or buy a new hdd/ssd, then you flash coreboot to the computer. After all this the malware can still remain in the firmware and you would never know unless the malware makes itself obviously known by a ransom attack or stealing all your crypto or something.”
This is untrue, the previous owner can theoretically get a virus that if the virus takes advantage of architecture exploits or zerodays. It could install a malicious firmware blob within your bios. The odds of this a rather rare and would rather half to be a widespread issue with the chipset. Or a threat actor would need to know the exact firmware and model of your motherboard. Flashing a new bios or updating your bios clears the chip that stores your boot firmware.
Malware lives on storage, an ssd or hardive can harbor malware as an infected OS. Some malware can live in RAM, but ram is cleared on a power cycle. If you got a used laptop and you update the bios and reinstall your os your fine, the OS should have proper sandboxing and seperated permissons. The cpu being old in certain models can be mitigated with patches and bios updates. However newer also doesnt mean more secure, certain am4 cpus had architectural flaws. At pwn-to-own buch of hackers using zero days to unlock heated seats on a tesla without paying the stupid subscription because of the CPU flaw and ram buffers.
And if you want to get tin foil hatty. How do you know you werent man in the middled when you bought a laptop from a retailer. What if a bad actor installed or tampered with the new laptop you bought. And now is less secure than a second hand laptop because joe down the street doesnt care what you do with the laptop as long as he gets paid. Or vice versa, how do you know joe didnt install malware on the pc so he can sell your information on the dark web??
And realistically there are alot of an attack surface for any device. Lets say you have your laptop and sombody steals it. Your using LUKS full disk encryption right? Lets say you did for this example, your headers for decryption are plaintext on boot. So a threat actor can use brutforce to crack your disk. You can setup LUKS to have your headers on a separate disk that you take with you. Its the equivalent of taking away a lock and a key. So all the threat actor is left with is a door. I can go on for hours about potential attack surfaces, TPM, secure boot, Intel management engine, ISP’s, SSD’S vs HDD’s.
“Privacy and Security are a mindset not a tool, device or service”
It depends on the model of the computer. I have personally librebooted a t440p thinkpad and although perhaps a usb controller can be reprogrammed. Id fine that highly unlikely, i had to buy a specific programmer, then realized the kind people on the libre boot form recommended a raspberry pi to program the ROM chips on the thinkpad. I then had to deconstruct the thinkpad to get acess to the 2 chips on the motherboard housing 2 firmwares. For the BIOs, i believe that it is highly unprobable for a usb port to re-program a usb HID device like a keyboard, mouse or camera. There a specific chips that are ESP programmers they are designed in a very particular way and exclusively are for programing and reading. Most chips are read only chips on USB devices for long jevity. And technically you can reprogram them, however you need an ESP programmer to connect to them and flash. And lets say theoretically you reprogram them with malware, it would be extremely hard to guess the manufacture of the usb controller chip as well as the layout of what pin does what. It was very complex to program an bios chip and certain models of computers have multible chip for certain things like firmware blobs. I think the artical is highly theoretical and never showed any real exploits being used in the wild. Im not an electronics engineer or anything but from what i know about playing with libre boot and arduinos it sounds unrealistic like 1995s hackers/watch dogs to reprogram usb bus’s with a built in usb bus.